Abstract Data outsourcing is plagued with several security and privacy concerns. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) can be used to address one of the many concerns, specifically to protect the privacy of data access pattern from outsourced cloud storage. This is achieved by simulating each original read or write operation with some read and write operations on both real and dummy data items. This paper proposes two single-server write-only ORAM schemes and one multi-server scheme, which simulate only the write operations and protect only the write pattern. The reduction in functionality however allows to build much simpler and efficient (in terms of communication/storage cost) ORAMs. Our schemes can achieve constant communication cost with acceptable storage usage. Write-only ORAM can be used in two situations: (i) only the write pattern is considered to contain sensitive information and needs protection. (ii) In outsourced data sharing, ORAM cannot be used to protect read pattern anyway due to access control issues, and Private Information Retrieval (PIR) has to be used instead. In this paper, we also study how to augment ORAM to support the use of PIR in the latter situation.
Introduction
With the advent of robust cloud platforms, there is a growing trend for businesses to outsource their IT infrastructure. However, there are many security and privacy concerns that arise from outsourcing data storage, for instance: confidentiality, integrity, forensics and access privacy [1] [2] [3] . In this paper, we focus on access privacy, i.e., the privacy of outsourced data's access pattern. The confidentiality of a user's data in outsourced storage can be protected by encryption. But encryption is not adequate to protect access privacy, which may still leak sensitive information, for example, predict stock actions from access sequence [4] [5] [6] [7] .
Oblivious RAM (Random Access Machine: an abstract computer model) is a technique to protect the privacy of a user's data access pattern from an honest but curious outsourced storage service. Before ORAM's usage in outsourced storage, originally ORAM was proposed in 1980s [8] to hide a software's data access pattern in RAM, for the purpose of protecting a software from being reverse engineered. A software can be re-complied to leverage on ORAM and simulate the original software's data operations on the memory using ORAM's methods like accessing dummy data items (dummy items for short), re-encrypting accessed data/dummy items, and obliviously shuffling items. From the view of the adversary, observing the software's memory access, whether a simulated operation is read or write is indistinguishable. ORAM also hides individual data item's access frequency and the linkage between the simulated operations on the same data item. Here, the CPU executing the software's operations and the CPU's internal storage, i.e., registers, are considered secure. The adversary cannot see the data in CPU. In recent years, ORAM was proposed to protect data access pattern on outsourced storages [3, 7, 9, 10] . As ORAM requires equalsize data items, its typical application is in the outsourced block storage for files [6, 11, 12] . This paper is focused on ORAM's outsourced storage usage. In this setup, the data user's node plays the roles of "software" and "CPU", while the outsourced storage plays the role of "memory". In the literature and this paper, such a user node is called ORAM client (client for short), and such an outsourced storage is called ORAM server (server for short).
Private Information Retrieval (PIR), first proposed in [13] , is another technique used to protect data user's privacy of read patterns from honest but curious outsourced storages. PIR allows users to retrieve a data item from a database without letting the database server know which item is being retrieved. Such a privacy primitive is used in diverse settings including patent databases [14] , pharmaceutical databases [14] , email systems [15] , e-commerce [16] , P2P file sharing systems [17] , etc. to hide an user's interest/profile.
Motivation This paper proposes write-only ORAM, and discusses how to use it with/without PIR to protect data access pattern. Traditional ORAM schemes are all full functional, which can simulate both write and read operations of standard non-oblivious RAM. This paper's write-only ORAM simulates only write operations and protects only the write pattern. As far as we know, this is the first work on write-only ORAM for outsourced storage. The reduction in functionality allows us to build simpler ORAM with better performance. Compared with traditional ORAM schemes, this paper's write-only ORAM schemes have lower (typically one order lower) communication cost, or require much less (typically at least one order less) client-side storage to achieve the same level of communication cost. Moreover, our schemes can achieve constant communication cost, and this is crucial given that communication cost is the most critical performance index of ORAM, which affects latency and user experience.
Write-only ORAM can be used in the situations below:
-Write and read patterns must be protected by ORAM and PIR respectively. Let's consider the scenario of data sharing via outsourced storage [18] . The data owner shares its data with consumers using an outsourced storage. The data owner's write pattern and data consumers' read patterns can be hidden from the outsourced storage using ORAM. However, to use ORAM, the data consumers would need to have write access, which is usually unacceptable. A malicious data consumer can tamper outsourced data with write access. To protect read patterns, data consumers have to use PIR instead. Then ORAM and PIR are used to protect data owner's write pattern and data consumers' read patterns, respectively. -Only write pattern needs protection. Let us consider the scenario of outsourced storage for data owner's usage only and the scenario of data sharing via outsourced storage. For some applications, a data user (which could be a data owner or data consumer) needs to use all data in the outsourced storage once or regularly. Such a read pattern usually does not contain any sensitive information. Then the user can trivially download all data without using expensive PIR or ORAM. Besides outsourced storage, write-only can be used in hidden volumes [19] , where only write pattern needs protection.
We can see that the ORAM used in above situations do not need to be fully functional. Write-only ORAM suffices for these purposes.
Contributions The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) Two novel single-server write-only ORAM schemes (basic write-only and advanced write-only ORAM) and a multi-server write-only ORAM scheme are proposed. The advanced as well as the multi-server schemes leverage on the basic scheme. The advantages of advanced write-only ORAM depend on proper optimization of parameters, which is also explored in the paper. Though write-only ORAM is functionally simpler than traditional full functional ORAM, this paper's contribution (i) is not trivial. New algorithms and new data layouts are used to realize the efficient design. The technical novelties are explained in Sects. 2 and 3. (ii) This paper studies and improves the method of supporting PIR clients in ORAM [18] . In outsourced data sharing, write and read patterns are protected by ORAM and PIR respectively. ORAM must be augmented to support PIR's use, and additional client-side storage usage is required. Compared with the original method in [18] , our improved method reduces the additional storage usage from O(N × log N ) to O(log N ), and the reduced usage is negligible compared with client-side storage usage required by ORAM.
Organization The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss the necessary background and related works. We formalize the system model and security model considered in this paper and give an overview of our ORAM design in Sect. 3. In Sects. 4 and 5, we present our basic and advanced single-server write-only ORAM schemes, respectively. In Sect. 6, we show how to extend the basic write-only ORAM scheme to a multi-server writeonly ORAM scheme. We augment ORAM to support PIR in Sect. 7. Our schemes are evaluated and compared with other schemes in Sect. 8. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 9.
Background and related work
In this section, we introduce related works on traditional ORAM, PIR and non-traditional ORAM (write-only ORAM and PIR-based ORAM). 
r is a small constant, and λ is a security parameter. * [9] has two ORAM constructions. This result is achieved by its basic ORAM construction. ** This is the communication cost between client and server. Additional O(log N × l) inter-server communication cost is also required in this scheme
Traditional ORAM
Most ORAM schemes are single-server schemes. Very few schemes [12, 20, 21] are multi-server schemes that assume k independent and non-colluding ORAM servers.
In Table 1 , we list the best traditional ORAM schemes that we have identified. Among traditional ORAM schemes, they have the lowest communication costs under different levels of storage usages. (Some costs are only achievable for certain ranges of N and l. For the outsourced storage usages considered in this paper, such costs can be achieved for most cases.) In Table 1 , we also list the schemes closest to ours and the best non-traditional ORAM schemes (write-only ORAM and PIR-based ORAM). The last two rows in the table are non-traditional schemes, while the other schemes are traditional ones. In this table and the rest of this paper, N denotes the maximum number of data items the system is designed to store at any time, and l is the data item length in bits.
ORAM schemes are mainly different in ORAM's structures (defined in this paper as the layout of data/dummy items at server side). There are mainly four kinds of ORAM structures (1-tier cache structure, pyramid structure, tree structure and bucket set structure), which were originally proposed in [8] 's square root ORAM scheme, [8] 's hierarchial scheme, [9, 10] respectively. Any known ORAM scheme except for [19] organizes the data/dummy items at server side with one of these original structures or their variants. The 1-tier cache structure is very simple. It has two storage areas, a cache and a main storage area, allocated for items. As an extension of 1-tier cache structure, the pyramid structure consists of multiple tiers of areas. From top tier to bottom tier, the tier size increases just like a pyramid. The bottom tier is the main storage area, and the other tiers are caches. In the tree structure, multiple storage areas are organized in a tree. The leaf nodes are for main storage, and the other nodes are caches. Each node is an ORAM itself, and referred to as a "bucket". In the bucket set structure, the ORAM has a set of buckets, each of which is an ORAM itself. From Table 1 , we can see that the most efficient traditional ORAMs all use a complicated structure.
In traditional ORAMs, oblivious shuffle is the most costly operation. It is performed after every or some oblivious read/write operations to hide the positions of the data items that have been accessed. Besides ORAM's structure, oblivious shuffle algorithm is the most important factor impacting ORAM's communication cost and storage usage. For smallcapacity ORAMs, it is feasible to use the trivial way to shuffle items: the ORAM client downloads all items, shuffles items locally, and upload items back to the ORAM server. For most schemes, item shuffle algorithms are based on oblivious sort algorithms like [30] and require very small client-side storage space (compared with ORAM's capacity). In schemes with tree or bucket set structure, shuffling items in a bucket is not very costly because item count in a bucket is smaller than that in the whole ORAM. However, these schemes also need to shuffle items globally by moving items across buckets. For the special case of multi-server ORAM schemes [12, 20] , a trivial non-oblivious shuffle in a server cannot be observed by the servers not colluding with it. Multi-server schemes [12, 20] all utilize this fact to realize oblivious shuffle algorithms based on non-oblivious shuffles at non-colluding servers, which are more efficient than single-server ORAMs' shuffle algorithms. Utilizing this fact, [12] 's scheme shifts client-server traffic to server-server traffic as well. The client-server communication cost in [12] 's scheme is only O(l). The inter-server communication cost in [12] 's scheme and the client-server communication cost in its single-server version [10] are both O(log N × l).
Square root ORAM in [8] and its variant in [22] are the ORAMs closest to our basic and multi-server write-only ORAMs. These two write-only ORAMs have the same structure, which is a variant of the original 1-tier cache structure in [8] . Our schemes also reuse [22] 's storage-area duplication technique to support concurrent access. The differences between our ORAMs and previous ORAMs of 1-tier cache structure are as follows. The cache in basic/multi-server write-only ORAM is for write only, and the sizes of main storage and cache are optimized for the write-only workload. Square root ORAM uses an oblivious shuffle algorithm based on oblivious sort, while our write-only ORAMs do not require oblivious shuffle. Instead, oblivious merge is required to update data items obliviously with new written values. Basic write-only ORAM's oblivious merge algorithm is based on a recently proposed oblivious sort algorithm [31] , and multi-server write-only ORAM's oblivious merge is based on oblivious remove and non-oblivious shuffles at the server side.
Stefanov et al. [10] 's ORAM is the ORAM closest to our advanced write-only ORAM. Inspired from [10] 's ORAM, advanced write-only ORAM also has a bucket set structure. Different from [10] 's ORAM, each bucket of advanced writeonly ORAM is a basic write-only ORAM. We also optimize the bucket count to reduce client-side storage usage under different configurations of N and l. Moreover, our advanced write-only ORAM has additional design features to support multiple ORAM clients. In contrast, Stefanov et al. [10] 's ORAM supports one client only because some stateful data of this scheme must be maintained at client side.
Previous multi-server ORAMs [12, 20] and our multiserver write-only ORAM all utilize the not-all-serverscolluding assumption to reduce communication cost and/or client-side storage usage. Compared with our multiserver scheme, the structures of [12, 20] are more complicated. Lu and Ostrovsky [20] 's scheme has a pyramid structure. Stefanov and Shi [12] 's scheme has a bucket set structure, and each bucket is an ORAM with a pyramid structure.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
Broadly, there are two kinds of PIR techniques-itPIR (information-theoretic PIR) and cPIR (computational PIR), providing unconditional and computational hardness-based privacy, respectively. The privacy in cPIR is guaranteed subject to computational bounds on the server, while all communication efficient itPIR schemes are multi-server based and assume that not all the servers collude together. Neither cPIR nor itPIR require that the data items in the database are encrypted. In cPIR, the user's PIR client encrypts the wanted data item's position in the database and sends the encrypted position as a query to the database server; the database server computes an answer using the encrypted position and all the data items in the database; the client decrypts the answer and obtains the desired data item. There is no single-server itPIR scheme apart the trivial one, i.e., downloading the whole database. Efficient multi-server itPIR schemes can be built under the conditions that each server holds a replication of the database and not all servers collude. A multi-server itPIR scheme is called a t-private k-server itPIR scheme if it requires k (k > 1) database servers and resists up to t (k > t ≥ 1) colluding servers. Suppose a database has N data items, a tprivate k-server itPIR works in the following way: the user's PIR client uses the position of the wanted data item to generate k queries, and sends each server a query; each server computes an answer using its received query and O(N ) data items in the database and sends the answers to the client; the client recovers the wanted data item from received answers. Any t or less servers together cannot learn any non-trivial information of the wanted data item's position from their received queries. In most itPIR schemes, a secret sharing scheme is used to generate shares from the secret position, and each share is a query [32, 33] .
The computational costs of cPIR and itPIR are both O(N × l). However, the constant in cPIR's O(N × l) cost is much higher, and itPIR's performance is better than cPIR's [34] . Originally, cPIR was considered impractical for normal database sizes [35] . Subsequently, efficient cPIR schemes were invented and considered computationally practical for restricted database sizes [34, 36] . Recently, cPIR and itPIR schemes exploiting parallelization of cloud/cluster computing [37] or GPU [38] were proposed to improve PIR's performance and make it practical for bigger databases. The parallelization of cloud computing can be exploited in this paper's outsourced storage scenarios, and some cloud providers like Amazon also provide virtual machines with GPU.
The communication costs of most PIR schemes are between O(log N + l) and O(N + l). Gentry and Ramzan [39] 's cPIR scheme can achieve O(log N + l) communication cost. Normally, in the scenarios considered in this paper, 
Combining ORAM with PIR
Most trusted-hardware-assisted PIR schemes [41] [42] [43] [44] are based on ORAM. These schemes share the same basic principle. A trusted coprocessor at the database server works as a representative of the PIR client. The trusted coprocessor uses ORAM to read the data item wanted by the PIR client from the server's storage obliviously, and returns the data item to the PIR client. Compared with PIR schemes without trusted hardware, these schemes have lower computational and communication costs. In this paper, we use normal PIR with write-only ORAM, and do not require trusted hardware at the server side. Also, the PIR discussed in this paper except this paragraph is normal PIR without trusted hardware.
In [18] , a privacy-preserving data sharing solution over outsourced storage was proposed. It uses full functional ORAM to protect the data owner's data update pattern and PIR to protect data consumers' read patterns. The design also considers the needs of pricing and access control, which allows the data owner to control which data items are accessible to a specific data consumer. Huang and Goldberg [18] utilizes existing ORAM and PIR schemes, and no new schemes were proposed. In this paper, we improve [18] 's method of supporting PIR clients in ORAM when combining write-only ORAM with PIR, to support the above scenario more efficiently.
The ORAM scheme in [9] is improved by [26] [27] [28] [29] using cPIR and PIR writing [45] as building blocks in [9] 's ORAM framework. PIR-writing is a technique very similar to cPIR. It can update a data item without letting the database server knowing which data item is updated. PIR-writing utilizes homomorphic encryption to modify every data item's ciphertext, and only one data item's plaintext is updated. The use of PIR and PIR-writing increases computational cost but results in lower communication cost. Mayberry et al. [26] reduces communication cost to O((log N ) 3 +(log N ) 2 ×l) with O(l) client-side storage. Devadas et al. [27] , Fletcher et al. [28] , Moataz et al. [29] , which utilizes PIR and PIR-writing more extensively, reduces communication cost to O(l). Different from with [26] [27] [28] [29] , this paper's schemes improve performance by reducing functionalities instead of utilizing PIR or PIR-writing.
Moataz et al. [21] proposed a multi-server ORAM scheme using itPIR and Private Information Storage (PIS) [46] . PIS is a technique based on itPIR. It can update a data item without disclosing to the database servers as to which data item is being updated. Since [21] 's ORAM scheme is based on itPIR, its computational cost is much lower than above ORAM schemes based on cPIR and PIR-writing. Different from [21] , this paper's schemes improve performance by reducing functionalities instead of utilizing PIR or PIS.
Write-only ORAM
A concurrent work [19] also proposed a very efficient writeonly ORAM scheme. This scheme is designed for protecting hidden volumes where there is only one ORAM client. It can be used for outsourced storage as well. However, this scheme supports only one client because some stateful data must be maintained at client side. It adopts a novel structure different from the four structures we summarized earlier. Data items are written to random free positions in the storage, and their positions are managed with a mapping table. Different from [19] , we focus on write-only ORAM in outsourced storage scenario, and we consider the cases of multiple ORAM clients and outsourced data sharing.
Overview of proposed ORAM schemes
In this section, we formalize the system model and security model considered in this paper and give an overview of our ORAM design.
System model
The system model considered in this paper is the same as the model in most ORAM works except that only write operations are simulated by ORAM and PIR are considered.
There are one or more data users in the system. For the model of single-server ORAM scheme, there is only one outsourced storage. For the model of multi-server ORAM scheme, there are multiple outsourced storages. An outsourced storage has abundant storage resources, and stores private data items from data user(s). Data user(s) outsource private data items and access the data in the outsourced storage(s).
The maximum number of data items in the outsourced storage is N . During the use of the outsourced storage, data items may be added or deleted. Thus, at any given time, the actual data count is equal to or less than N . Data items' indices, i.e., IDs, are in {1, 2, . . . N }, and all data items have same length: l bits.
Data users need to hide their write patterns, which contain sensitive information. So, data users play the roles of ORAM clients, while the outsourced storage(s) play the role(s) of ORAM server(s). Read patterns are not protected by ORAM. Either they do not contain sensitive information, or they must be hidden by using PIR. Such situations are elaborated in Sect. 1. Therefore, only write operations need to be simulated by ORAM, and PIR may be used with ORAM. As introduced in Sect. 2, the use of PIR requires knowing the desired data item's location in the server. Due to the use of ORAM, the location is hidden to the server and unpredictable. To support PIR, ORAM should be augmented with a location management function.
Security model
Trustworthiness of server The outsourced storage, i.e., the ORAM server, is considered honest but curious. The server has incentives to learn client's access pattern, which contains sensitive information. However, the server won't tamper stored data, or tampering will be detected using techniques like MAC (Message Authentication Code) and signature. For the case of multiple ORAM servers, we require that not all servers collude. More specifically, the multi-server scheme can be characterized as a t-private k-server scheme (t < k), which is secure only if at most t of all the k servers collude.
Trustworthiness of clients In contrast to most existing works in the literature which consider single ORAM client and single ORAM server, our approach supports the possibility of data consumers' non-ORAM clients, multiple ORAM clients and multiple ORAM servers. In such a setting, the (write-only) ORAM mechanisms do not prevent the data consumers' clients from learning about the data owner's write pattern since they have read access to the data, and thus they can repeatedly read the whole data to identify the differences. This is not a problem. Usually, data consumers are trusted to know the write pattern as they are trusted to know the data. (The major reason of using ORAM to hide write pattern is hiding some sensitive information about the data.) In some applications, the data owner even need to inform data consumers to obtain the new data. Likewise, when multiple ORAM clients collaboratively mutate a collection of data, they can (as well as need to) also see what changes are being made by others. (For example, the data owner is a company and the ORAM clients of multiple employees access the data stored in the ORAM server. For another example, multiple companies share their data and collaboratively process the shared data.) Therefore, in this paper, we assume ORAM clients and data consumers are all trusted to know the write pattern. We do not protect an ORAM client's write pattern from other ORAM clients and consumers. However, a data consumer may want to hide its read pattern from everyone by using PIR.
Security of full functional ORAM and write-only ORAM
Our security definition follows the one in ORAM literature: Definition 1 Security of full functional ORAM The input of an ORAM client or a group of ORAM clients is a sequence of data operations (simulated data operations), and the ith operation is denoted as (op i , q i , x i ). op i is the type of data operation, which could be read or write. A read operation retrieves the value of the data item indexed q i , while a write operation sets the value of the data item indexed q i to x i . An ORAM system is considered secure if, for any two equal-length sequences of data operations, which sequence is chosen by the ORAM client(s) as input is computationally indistinguishable for the ORAM server(s).
The security definition for write-only ORAM is the same as the above one for full functional ORAM except that all data operations are write operations.
Definition 2 Security of write-only ORAM
The input of an ORAM client or a group of ORAM clients is a sequence of write operations (simulated operations), and the i-th operation is denoted as (q i , x i ). The i-th operation sets the value of the data item indexed q i to x i . A write-only ORAM system is considered secure if, for any two equal-length sequences of write operations, which sequence is chosen by the ORAM client(s) as input is computationally indistinguishable for the ORAM server(s).
A data user using write-only ORAM may perform read operations as well, but these operations are not simulated/protected with ORAM. Read pattern can be protected by PIR, or read pattern does not need protection. Thus to say, both full functional and write-only ORAM hide individual data item's access frequency and the linkage between the simulated operations operating on the same data item. Full functional ORAM also hides the type of any data operation, which write-only ORAM does not. The ORAM server, however, knows how many operations are executed during any time period, which is assumed not containing sensitive information.
Parameter values
As introduced in Sect. 1, this paper focuses on ORAM's application in outsourced storage especially the outsourced block storage for file systems. Our ORAM schemes are designed considering the characteristic and typical parameter values of this application. The characteristic has been discussed earlier. Now we give a discussion on the typical parameter values.
The block size (i.e., data item size) depends on the sizes of stored files. For generic file systems widely used today (e.g., NTFS, EXT3 and FAT32), the block size is usually configured to a value between 4KB and 64KB. For file systems designed for big files like media files and scientific data files, the block size is bigger. For example, the default block sizes in current versions of GPFS [47] and VMFS [48] are 256KB and 1MB respectively. In the extreme cases of HDFS [49] and Google File System [50] for huge files, the default block size is 64MB. In the experiments on ORAM implementations [6, 11, 12] , the block size ranges from 4KB to 16KB. In the experiment of the ORAM designed for big files [26] , the block size is 1MB. In this paper, we consider block sizes between 4KB and 64MB. Recall than l in this paper is the data item length in bits. Then we have 2 29 ≥ l ≥ 2 15 .
In existing experiments on ORAM implementations [6, 11, 12, 26 ], ORAM's capacity (i.e., the maximum amount of data an ORAM can store) ranges from 13GB to 320TB. In this paper, we consider capacities from 8GB to 8PB, and we expect at least 1TB capacity for big block sizes (1MB or bigger). We do not consider smaller capacities for two reasons. First, the outsourced storage is used usually because there is a large amount of data. The data owner may use his/her own storage for a small amount of data. Second, if there is only a small amount of data, ORAM's communication cost and client-size storage usage are very low. There is no strong need to reduce such cost and usage, and we are more interested to the reduction for high ORAM capacities. Recall than N in this paper the maximum number of data items an ORAM can sustain. Then we have 2 56 bits ≥ N × l ≥ 2 36 bits. Based on above assumptions on block size and ORAM capacity, we also have 2 41 ≥ N ≥ 2 14 .
Design overview of write-only ORAM schemes
Our basic write-only ORAM has a very simple structure, which is a variant of [8] 's 1-tier cache structure. Different from [8] 's structure, our structure is optimized for the write-only workload and reuses the storage-area duplication technique [22] to enable concurrent access. A novel oblivious merge algorithm based on oblivious sort is designed for basic write-only ORAM to update data items obliviously with new written values.
The advanced write-only ORAM uses the basic write-only ORAM as a building block. Advanced write-only ORAM's construction contains multiple buckets, and each bucket is implemented as a basic write-only ORAM. We optimize the bucket count to reduce client-side storage usage in different configurations of N and l. The advanced write-only ORAM also needs to maintain a table named bucket mapping table containing the mappings from item indices to bucket numbers. The bucket mapping table is maintained at the client side if there is only a single ORAM client. If there are multiple ORAM clients, the table is maintained at the server side as an additional basic write-only ORAM.
The multi-server write-only ORAM also builds on the basic write-only ORAM, but uses a different oblivious merge mechanism to update values of data items. Basic write-only ORAM uses an oblivious merge algorithm based on a oblivious sort algorithm [31] . Giving the assumption that not all servers collude, the multi-server write-only ORAM adopts a low-cost multi-server oblivious merge based on oblivious remove and multiple non-oblivious shuffles at server side.
4 Basic single-server write-only ORAM
Preliminary: probabilistic encryption
The same as existing ORAM schemes, data/dummy items uploaded to the server are encrypted with a semantically secure probabilistic encryption [51] scheme, and therefore, two encrypted copies of the same item look different. The server cannot identify whether these two copies correspond to the same item or not.
Construction

ORAM structure
Our basic ORAM's structure is a variant of [8] 's 1-tier cache structure. As shown in Fig. 1 , the server-side storage contains two areas: a main part and a write cache. Both areas have N slots, and each slot can store one encrypted data item or dummy item. Dummy items are used to hide data item count and access pattern from the server. The main part is always filled with N encrypted items, while the write cache storing recently written items is not always full.
Some meta data of an item, e.g., data item index, item type (real data item or dummy item) and freshness level, are encrypted and stored along with the item's content. The freshness level is used for detecting outdated data items, which will be introduced later. The ORAM client can determine whether an item is a data item or dummy item only after decrypting it, and accordingly get the item's index and freshness level if the item is a data item.
At the beginning, the ORAM client initializes the main part by uploading N encrypted items to it, and the write cache is empty. These N items include all data items outsourced at the beginning and may be some dummy items for hiding current data item count. During the use of ORAM, the main part is always full so that the server cannot tell the actual data item count in the main part. There may be N or less data items in the main part, and the remaining items, if any, are dummy items.
Simulation of a write operation
Every time the ORAM client does an oblivious write operation of an item, the client encrypts the item and uploads it to the first empty slot in the write cache. If the write cache is full after writing an item, the ORAM client does an oblivious merge: it obliviously updates the main part with the recently written data items in the write cache, and empties the write cache. After the oblivious merge, newly added data items are put in the main part, and the outdated data items in the main part are replaced with the most updated data items. Please note that the server cannot detect whether an item's plaintext has changed or not after the oblivious merge because every item's ciphertext changes due to use of a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme.
Oblivious merge algorithms
There are two oblivious merge algorithms for basic writeonly ORAM: the one based on oblivious sort and a trivial one. Oblivious merge based on oblivious sort is used in most cases. When the basic write-only ORAM is used as a building block in other ORAM schemes, the trivial oblivious merge may be used. These two oblivious merge algorithms are given as below. Oblivious merge based on oblivious sort The ORAM client does the oblivious merge based on oblivious sort by following steps, and a toy example is shown in Fig. 2. -First, tag data items with freshness levels.
The client scans all items, and tags each data item with a freshness level. For a data item in the main part, its freshness level is 0. For a data item in the write cache, its freshness level is its position in the write cache (positions are 1-based here). A data item's tag is encrypted along with its content so that the server cannot learn any data item's freshness level. Because every scanned item is re-encrypted with a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme, the server can't learn any scanned item's type (data item or dummy item) either. -Second, sort items by the combination of item type, index and freshness level.
The client sorts the items in the server using a dataoblivious external-storage sort algorithm. In our case, the outsourced storage is the "external-storage". We use [31] 's oblivious sort algorithm. After sorting, items of the sorted list are in the order that: (1) data items before dummy items; (2) the data item with smaller index before the data item with bigger index; (3) for data items with The client scans the sorted list, removes tags, and replaces outdated data items with dummy items. The client detects outdated data items by comparing adjacent data items' indices and freshness levels. If two data items have the same index, the item with lower freshness level is outdated. -Fourth, sort items by item type.
The client sorts all items again obliviously. Goodrich [31] 's oblivious sort algorithm is used again here. After sorting, items are in the order that data items are before dummy items. -Fifth, discard N dummy items.
The client asks the server to put the first N items of the sorted item list in the main part.
Remark The second and fourth steps are the most costly steps. They require oblivious sorts. Under the assumption of l ≥ (log N ) ε (ε > 0 is a small constant), Goodrich [31] 's oblivious sort algorithm produces following communication cost for sorting a list of N items:
Here, r ≥ 1 and r is a small constant which can be omitted in O(N × r × l). Normally, l ≥ (log N ) ε stands. It is also acceptable to choose a value for r ≥ 2. In this paper, we specifically assume r ≥ 2, which will simplify the analysis of costs. 
Trivial oblivious merge If the ORAM client has O(N × l)
storage space, it can do a trivial oblivious merge locally. First, the client downloads all items and picks the most updated data items. Second, the client re-encrypts the picked data items and uploads them to the server. Third, if the number of uploaded data items is less than N , the client creates one or some dummy items, and uploads the dummy item(s) to fill the main part. A client having O(N × l) storage space is usually not practical. However, when the basic write-only ORAM is used as a building block in other ORAM schemes, this trivial oblivious merge may be practical and useful.
Concurrent access and multiple clients
Concurrent read/write during oblivious merge
An oblivious merge may take a long time when there are many items. To enable concurrent read/write operations from the same or other clients during the oblivious merge, we use [22] 's technique of storage-area duplication here. This technique also reduces worse-case communication cost. As shown in Fig. 3 , the server allocates space for a new main part and a new write cache. The oblivious merge outputs the merged items to new main part. A concurrent ORAM write can put the data item in the new write cache. Recall that a data user may retrieve data items using PIR, or download all data items directly. The data items are retrieved/downloaded from the old main part, old write cache and new write cache. When the oblivious merge is done, items in the old main part and old write cache will be deleted. Because write operations during oblivious merge are enabled, the oblivious merge can be de-amortized. There is no need to finish the merge immediately. The merge work can be partitioned to N parts, and each part is conducted after a write operation. Then the worse-case communication cost is the same as amortized communication cost.
Key sharing for data consumers and multiple ORAM clients
A symmetric encryption scheme like AES can be used in ORAM. In the outsourced data sharing scenario, cryptographic keys should be shared to data consumers so that they can decrypt retrieved data items. There may be multiple ORAM clients (e.g., the data owner is a company and multiple employees access the data stored in the ORAM server).
A client needs to decrypt data/dummy items encrypted by other clients during an oblivious merge. Then keys should be shared among ORAM clients too. The simplest way of managing and sharing keys is using the same key for all items like most ORAMs and pre-sharing the key like [23] . Alternatively, Huang and Goldberg [18] 's way can be used. Huang and Goldberg [18] uses different keys for different items and considers access control when sharing keys. By control the access to keys, the data owner can control which data items are accessible to a specific data consumer. Please refer to [18] for the details.
Analysis
Security In this scheme, the write operation is simulated by simply putting a data item in the write cache. Clearly, the ORAM client's behaviors are independent of the data item's index and previous written data items' indices. When the cache is full, an oblivious merge is conducted. Suppose it is a trivial oblivious merge. Then it is done at the client side, and the server cannot observe the merge process. Suppose it is an oblivious merge based oblivious sort. From the description of the merge algorithm, it is easy to find out that each step of the merge is oblivious to the server. Thus, from the perspective of the server, all the client's behaviors in this scheme are independent of data items' indices. The server does not know the index of any data item being written or having been written. The server cannot find the linkage between two write operations writing on the same data item. The server does not know if a given data item is updated more frequently than other items. Overhead This write-only ORAM uses O(N × l) serverside storage. The communication cost of an oblivious write is O(l) under the condition l ≥ (log N ) ε , which normally stands in ORAM's outsourced storage usage. (ε > 0 is a small constant.) If the client-side storage usage is O(l) (resp. O(N 1/r ×l)), the communication cost of an oblivious merge is O(N × log N × l) (resp. O (N × l) ). An oblivious merge is performed after every N oblivious writes. So the amortized communication cost of an oblivious write is: O(l) when client-side storage is O(N 1/r ×l); O(log N ×l) when clientside storage is O(l). Here, r ≥ 2 and r is a small constant. Due to the use of [22] 's technique of storage-area duplication, the worse-case communication costs in our schemes are the same as the amortized costs.
Advanced single-server write-only ORAM
Construction
Using O(N 1/r × l) bits client-side storage, basic write-only ORAM can achieve an amortized communication cost of O(l) bits. (Here, r ≥ 2 and r is a small constant.) By employing basic write-only ORAM as a building block, advanced write-only ORAM achieves O(l) bits amortized communication cost as well with less client-side storage usage when
More about the suitable situations and choices of our schemes will be discussed in Sect. 8 .
ORAM structure As shown in Fig. 4 , the server-side storage contains K buckets (K < N ), and each bucket is a basic write-only ORAM that can store at most B data items. So the bucket size is O(B × l) bits. The values of K and B depend on N and l, which will be discussed later. A table named bucket mapping table containing the mappings from item indices to bucket numbers is maintained at the client side or server side. The table has N entries, and the i-th entry stores the i-th data item's bucket number. If the i-th data item does not exist, the i-th entry stores a special number (e.g., -1) indicating the non-existence of the data item. If there is only one ORAM client, the table is maintained at the client side. Otherwise, as shown in Fig. 4 , all table entries are maintained at the server side in an additional basic write-only ORAM. An entry contains a data item index and a bucket number. Then the entry size is O(log N + log K ) = O(log N ) bits, and the ORAM size (server-side storage for the ORAM) is O(N × log N ) bits.
Simulation of write operations An ORAM client obliviously writes a data item to the outsourced storage by following steps. First, it encrypts the data item locally with a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme. Second, it chooses a bucket uniformly at random, and oblivious writes the data item to the bucket ORAM. Third, it updates the data item's bucket number in the bucket mapping table.
Oblivious merge of bucket mapping table If the bucket mapping table is maintained in a basic write-only ORAM at the server side, an ORAM client can utilize O(N × log N ) client-side storage to do a trivial oblivious merge of this basic write-only ORAM locally. Then the amortized communication cost of updating bucket mapping table is O(log N ), which is less than O(l) normally. So updating the data item's bucket number will not increase the amortized communication cost of writing data item no matter the bucket mapping table is maintained at client side or server side. In the case that a bucket's main part is overflowed during an oblivious merge, the client concurrently inserts each overflowed data item to a random chosen bucket by doing an oblivious write. Please note that reads/writes during oblivious merge are supported and a write operation during/after oblivious merge puts an item in a new cache. Therefore, even if a bucket's main part is overflowed during the oblivious merge, items still can be written to this bucket during and after the merge. As discussed below, B is set to a proper value to make overflow extremely rare.
Parameter optimization
Now we discuss how to choose the values of K and B. Our goal is to minimize client-side storage usage O(N × log N + B 1/r × l) while keeping amortized communication cost of an oblivious write as O(l) and server-side storage usage as O(N ×l). To keep server-side storage usage as O(N ×l), we need to set B as O(N /K ). Based on the standard balls in bins analysis [52] , the bucket with most data items has O(N /K ) data items with high probability if N ≥ K × log K . (Please refer to Appendix 1 for the details.) So we choose K 's value to make N ≥ K × log K .
As analyzed above, if the bucket mapping table is maintained at the client side, O(l) amortized communication cost can be achieved. However, if the bucket mapping table is shared at the server for multiple clients, the amortized communication cost is O (l + N /B ×log N ) . In that case, we must make
Therefore, to meet our goal, following conditions must be met: N ) if there are multiple ORAM clients. Below, we show how to configure K and B to meet these conditions.
-If there are multiple ORAM clients and N ≥ l, we set K 's value as the maximal integer that can make 
Security analysis
All the operations in advanced write-only ORAM are oblivious. In the simulation of a write operation, a data item is written to a bucket. The bucket to store the written item is chosen at random, and every bucket is a basic write-only ORAM. So, from the server's perspective, both the choice of the bucket and the operation on the bucket are independent of the written item. Besides these operations, a client also maintains a bucket mapping table. If the bucket mapping table is maintained at the server side, table entries are stored in a basic write-only ORAM. Alternatively, the table is maintained at the client side. In either way, operations on the table are oblivious to the server. The bucket mapping table is updated after writing a data item. When the write cache of a bucket or the bucket mapping table at server side is full, an oblivious merge is performed. Therefore, the types of performed operations (write or oblivious merge) and the buckets to be operated are independent of written data items' indices. Any two write operation sequences with the same length are indistinguishable to the server.
Multi-server write-only ORAM
In this section, we design a t-private k-server write-only ORAM scheme based on the basic single-server write-only ORAM. Assuming not more than t colluding servers, this scheme can be used with a t-private k-server itPIR scheme. It can be used in the cases that data users use single-server PIR or download all data items trivially too. Compared with basic write-only ORAM, this multi-server write-only ORAM has lower client-side storage usage when
. This ORAM's client-side storage usage is also lower than advanced write-only ORAM's. More about the suitable situations and choices of our schemes will be discussed in Sect. 8.
Construction
The only difference between multi-server write-only ORAM and basic write-only ORAM is oblivious merge. Suppose there are k servers, and the number of colluding servers are not more than t. Multi-server write-only ORAM scheme utilizes t + 1 servers to do an oblivious merge. The client(s) run(s) the write-only ORAM in one server, and synchronizes the changes of the database to every other server. The synchronization is required by the use of multi-server PIR, but is optional for data users using single-server PIR or downloading all data items trivially. When the ORAM's write cache is full, the client utilizes t + 1 servers to do an oblivious merge. Suppose the server running ORAM is indexed 1. The client chooses other t servers randomly. We index these servers from 2 to t + 1. As illustrated in Fig. 5 , the ORAM client does the oblivious merge based on oblivious remove and multiple non-oblivious shuffles by following steps.
-First, create a bitmap for detecting outdated data items.
The client creates a bitmap of N bits. The bitmap is used to detect outdated data items. Let's call this bitmap detective bitmap. The i-th bit being 1 means that one or more data items with index i have been scanned. The bitmap is initialized as all zeros in this step.
-Second, replace outdated data items in write cache with dummy items. The client scans the write cache of the first server from tail to head, replaces outdated data items with dummy items. Because the cache is scanned from tail to head, more recently written items are scanned before less recently written ones. During the scan, if a data item indexed i is found, the client checks the i-th bit of the detective bitmap. If the i-th bit is zero, which means this item is the most updated, the client sets the i-th bit as 1. Then the client re-encrypts the data item and puts it back to its slot in the write cache. If the i-th bit is 1, which means a more updated version of the i-th data item exists, the client puts a dummy item back to the data item's slot. -Third, replace outdated data items in main part with dummy items. The client scans the main part of the first server, replaces outdated data items with dummy items. The same as the second step, outdated data items are detected by utilizing the detective bitmap. -Fourth, servers indexed 1, 2, . . . t +1 take turns to shuffle items.
The first server shuffles all items in its main part and write cache. Then servers indexed 2, 3, . . . t + 1 take turns to shuffle these items. After a server, say the i-th server, finishes shuffling, the client scans shuffled items one by one, and at the same time re-encrypts and uploads scanned items to the next server for the next round of shuffle. At last, the items been shuffled t + 1 rounds are stored in a temporary space of the (t + 1)-th server. -Fifth, discard N dummy items, and output the result.
The client scans the shuffled items from the (t + 1)-th server. At the same time, the client re-encrypts and uploads scanned data items to the first server's new main part. If data item count is less than N , the client also re-encrypts and uploads one or more dummy items to fill the new main part during the scan. So N dummy items are discarded. The data item count can be measured during the second or third step and stored with a counter of log N bits.
If data consumers use multi-server PIR, the change of the ORAM is also synchronized to other servers after the oblivious merge. To keep every server's ORAM identical and allow concurrent PIR read, in the second, third and fourth steps, the client should operate on the copies of the write cache and main part instead.
Security analysis
We focus on the security in oblivious merge because the only difference between multi-server and basic write-only ORAMs is oblivious merge. After first three steps of oblivious merge, outdated data items are replaced with dummy items and updated data items are kept in their original positions before the oblivious merge. No information about the write pattern leaks in the first three steps because the ORAM client's behaviors are independent of the write pattern. In the fourth step, items in the database are shuffled t + 1 times. In the fifth step, updated data items and maybe some dummy items are outputted to the first server as the result of the oblivious merge, and N dummy items of the (t + 1)-th shuffle's result are discarded. By observing the upload speed of outputting the oblivious merge's result, the first server learns information about positions of updated data items and dummy items in the (t+1)-th shuffle's result. If the first server can correlate the items before and after the t + 1 shuffles by colluding with some servers, it knows information about updated data items' positions before oblivious merge and write pattern. However, if not more than t servers collude, no server can learn the information. The i-th server can correlate the items before and after the i-th shuffle only. If any t of the k servers collude, they can correlate at most t shuffles' input items and output items, but can't correlate the items before and after t + 1 shuffles. Therefore, if colluding server count is not more than t, the oblivious merge is secure. The same conclusion can be drawn from the security of mix network [53] too. In essentials, the client and the servers shuffling items form a special kind of mix network.
Storage usage and communication cost
The client-side and server-side storage usages are O(N + l) and O(N ×l) bits, respectively. t and k are small integers, and viewed as constants in this paper. Then the communication cost of an oblivious merge is O(N × l). An oblivious merge is performed after every N oblivious writes. So the amortized communication cost is O(l).
Supporting PIR clients
As discussed in Sect. 1, sometimes ORAM cannot be used to protect read patterns, for instance, in data publishing setup where the reader ought not have write permission to the data, in which case, PIR must be used instead. To support PIR clients, ORAM must be augmented. The approach proposed here is applicable to ORAM schemes of 1-tier cache structures such as the proposed basic and advanced writeonly ORAM schemes. It is also applicable to other ORAM schemes with slight alterations.
Construction
As introduced in Sect. 2, a client needs to know the desired data item's location in the server before using PIR to retrieve [18] has proposed an efficient method to read and update such a mapping table obliviously. We reuse its method after two major modifications for reducing client-side storage usage and summarize the modified method as below.
Layout and write/read entries As shown in Fig. 6 , the slot mapping table and two caches are maintained in the ORAM server. The original design of [18] has only one cache of √ N slots. This cache is for updating one entry after an ORAM write of a data item. We refer to this cache as cache A. We add a cache of N slots for updating the whole table after an oblivious merge/shuffle of data items. We refer to this cache as cache B. After an oblivious write of a data item, the ORAM client inserts the updated entry of the data item in cache A. To lookup a data item's location, the PIR client not only retrieves the item's entry in the We make a modification to reduce client-side storage usage here. In our design, the client does not store a local slot mapping table. Instead, the client obliviously merge the entries in the table and cache A based on oblivious sort, which is the same as the oblivious merge algorithm for data items in Sect. 4.3. To enable concurrent read/write during the oblivious merge, Goodrich et al. [22] 's technique of storage-area duplication is used again: an additional empty cache can be used for concurrent writes, and concurrent reads can retrieve entries from the slot mapping 
r ≥ 2 and r is a small constant. ε > 0 is a small constant * To achieve above client storage costs and communication costs, l cannot be lower than the lower bound items are put in the new main part. The client scans the new main part, inserts index-to-location mapping entries for these N items in cache B. If an item is a dummy item, a dummy entry for the dummy item is also inserted. When cache B is filled with the N items' entries, the client does an oblivious merge to update the slot mapping table with entries in cache B. Again, this oblivious merge is based on oblivious sort, which is the same as the oblivious merge algorithm for data items in Sect. 4.3. Security To support the use of PIR, an ORAM client needs to do additional operations on the slot mapping table, i.e., write entries to the table's caches and do oblivious merges of entries. Before using PIR to retrieve a data item, a PIR client also needs to do additional operations on the table for retrieving the item's location. These additional operations will not expose access patterns. The ORAM client writes an entry to cache A after every ORAM write. Entries are written to cache B after an oblivious merge/shuffle of data items. When cache A or B is full, an oblivious merge of entries is conducted. To the server, these behaviors of the ORAM client are independent of written items' indices as well as the read pattern of PIR client(s). A PIR client looks up an item's location by retrieving the item's entry in the table using PIR and downloading all entries in cache A. To the server, the PIR client's behaviors are independent of the read item's index as well as the write pattern of ORAM client(s). Thus, maintaining and looking up the table will not expose any access pattern.
Analysis
Amortized communication cost of an oblivious write
Multi-server PIR support
ORAM may be used with single-server or multi-server PIR to protect access information. A single-server ORAM scheme can be used with a multi-server PIR scheme though they require different number of servers. A multi-server PIR scheme requires that each server has a replication of the database. In another word, at any given position of the database, every server stores the same item. To use ORAM and multiserver PIR together, every server needs to store the identical encrypted item at the same position. The ORAM client can run the single-server ORAM in one server and synchronize the changes of the ORAM to every other server. Then, to use with a k-server PIR, the communication cost of ORAM is increased at most k times. k is regarded as a small constant. The communication cost is proportionally increased, but the order of magnitude thus stays the same.
Similarly, a multi-server ORAM scheme may be used together with a single-server PIR scheme. However, multiserver PIR scheme is computationally more efficient than a single-server one. If using multi-server ORAM scheme, multi-server PIR scheme should be chosen over single-server PIR scheme.
Evaluation
The choice of write-only ORAM schemes
Our write-only ORAM schemes' communication costs and storage usages are shown in Table 2 . There is no big constant hidden in these costs and usages. All three schemes can achieve the same O(l) communication cost but require different client-side storage usages. The advanced scheme's usage is lower than the basic scheme's if O(N × log N ) < O(N 1/r × l). The multi-server scheme's usage is lower than single-server schemes ' 
. Then the advanced scheme should be chosen over the basic scheme if N < l, while the multi-server scheme should be chosen over singleserver schemes if N < l and multiple non-colluding severs are available. As introduced in Sect. 3, our work and many other works focus on ORAM's usage of outsourced block storage, and we consider block sizes between 4KB and 64MB mainly. To show the ORAM settings suitable for the advanced and multi-server schemes, we list some cases of N < l under some typical block sizes below.
Settings suitable for advanced/multi-server write-only ORAM Block size 4KB 16KB 64KB 1MB 64MB ORAM capacity <128MB <2GB <32GB <8TB <32PB
We can see that the advanced and multi-server schemes can be used for a wider range of ORAM capacity if the block size is bigger. As we expect to use an outsourced storage for a large amount of data, these two schemes' are not suitable for small block sizes in most cases. Therefore, using the basic write-only scheme to store small blocks (block size ≤ 16KB) is better than using the other two schemes in most cases. If storing huge files only, huge block sizes (e.g., 64MB) are preferable and the advanced and multi-server schemes are better in most cases. For other block sizes, there are many settings suitable for each scheme.
Comparison of proposed ORAM schemes and existing schemes
Let's consider ORAM without supporting PIR first. Please note that the costs in Tables 1 and 2 are the costs without supporting PIR. Devadas et al. [27] , Fletcher et al. [28] , Moataz et al. [29] , Moataz et al. [21] , Blass et al. [19] are the most efficient schemes in terms of communication cost and storage cost. The same as them, this paper's schemes can achieve the O(l) communication cost and O(N × l) server-side storage, which are the lowest possible values. In the case of small block sizes, this paper's schemes use more client-side storage than they do. However, communication cost, which affects latency and user experience, is usually more critical, and the client-side storage usages in our schemes are acceptable in many cases. Besides, our schemes still have some functional or performance advantages over [19, 21, [27] [28] [29] . Our schemes support multiple ORAM clients, thus enabling use of ORAM in collaborative settings, while [19] 's scheme supports only a single ORAM client. Compared with [27] [28] [29] , our schemes' computational costs are lower. In our schemes and other schemes not based on PIR or PIR writing, the most computationally costly works are: decrypting data items from the server; encrypting data items before sending them to the server. So the computational cost and communication are of the same order of magnitude. Therefore, Blass et al. [19] and our schemes can achieve a computational cost of O(l). For ORAMs based on PIR and PIR-writing [27] [28] [29] , PIR and PIR-writing are the most costly parts. The computational cost in [27] [28] [29] is O(log 2 N × l), which is higher. PIR and PIR-writing require homomorphic encryption, which is also much more expensive than the symmetric encryption used for ORAM too. Moataz et al. [21] is a multi-server scheme requiring multiple non-colluding servers. In contrast, we have single-server schemes, and l's lower bound in our single-server and multi-server schemes is much lower than that in [21, [27] [28] [29] , which is at least O(log 4 N ).
Compared with the other schemes, our schemes have lower communication cost or require less client-side storage usage to achieve the same communication cost. Besides above schemes and our schemes, only [12] can achieve constant communication cost. However, Stefanov and Shi [12] requires much more client-side storage (O( √ N × l)), multiple non-colluding servers and O(log N × l) inter-server communication. For the other ORAM schemes, O(log N ×l) is the best communication cost. Compared with the multiserver scheme achieving this cost [20] , our basic ORAM can achieve the same communication cost and client-side storage usage with only one server. Compared with the single-server schemes achieving this cost [3, 10, 22, 23] , our single-server schemes can achieve this cost with much less client-side storage usage (O(l) only), or use at most the same client-side storage usage (O(N 1/r × l)) to achieve lower communication cost (O(l)). Therefore, our single-server schemes reduce communication cost by a factor of log N or client-side storage usage by a factor of N 1/r . As N 's typical value is between 2 14 and 2 41 (see the analysis in Sect. 3), communication cost or client-side storage usage can be reduced by about one order in most cases.
As discussed in Sect. 7, to support PIR in the data sharing scenario, both write-only ORAM and full functional ORAM should be augmented, and this is done using the same approach. If using O(N 1/r × log N ) client-side storage to support PIR, the communication costs of both write-only ORAM and full functional ORAM will be increased by O( √ N × log N ). For the settings of N and l in outsourced data sharing, we have l ≥ N 1/r × log N for most cases and l ≥ √ N × log N for many cases. So supporting PIR barely increases the orders of magnitude of storage usage and communication cost. Therefore, supporting PIR barely changes the performance differences among ORAM schemes. Even if PIR is supported, the proposed ORAM schemes still achieve good performance.
When using PIR together with ORAM, the system's computational cost increases because PIR's computational cost is higher than ORAM's. As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the computational costs of cPIR and itPIR are both O(N ×l), and the constant in cPIR's O(N × l) cost is much higher. So using itPIR is preferable. However, as also discussed in Sect. 2.2, the use of itPIR may require many independent servers (at least two non-colluding servers). For some situations, only one server may be available, and cPIR must be used. Please note that PIR is required to protect read patterns in outsourced data sharing no matter whether full functional ORAM is used or write-only ORAM is used to protect write patterns. Thus, the increased computational cost is the same for systems using full functional ORAM and write-only ORAM.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, two single-server write-only ORAM schemes and one multi-server write-only ORAM scheme have been proposed to hide the write pattern on honest but curious outsourced storages. Write-only ORAM can be used when read pattern does not contain sensitive information. It also can be used with PIR in outsourced data sharing where read pattern must be protected by PIR. The approach of augmenting ORAM to support PIR has also been studied in the paper. The storage and communication costs of proposed write-only ORAM schemes have been evaluated with realistic settings in outsourced storage. The result shows that the proposed schemes can achieve constant communication cost with acceptable storage usage, which outperforms most ORAM schemes.
Appendix: Maximum bucket load in advanced writeonly ORAM
Raab and Steger [52] analyzes the maximum load in the standard balls in bins problem under different settings of ball count and bin count. In advanced write-only ORAM, data item distribution can be seen as a variant of the standard problem. Data items and buckets in ORAM are seen as balls and bins, respectively. In the standard problem, N balls are distributed to K bins uniformly at random. From the Theorem 1 in [52] , we can know that the maximum number of balls in any bin is higher than max(2 × N /K , 2 × log K ) with extremely low probability. If N ≥ K ×log K , the maximum load in any bin is not more than 2×N /K with extremely high probability.
Then we can set a bucket capacity of B = 2×N /K data items, and achieve O(N × l) server-side storage and extremely rare overflows. If a bucket is overflowed, redistributing overflowed data items makes data item distribution different from the distribution in the standard balls in bins problem. However, a bucket capacity of 2× N /K is still big enough to make overflow rare after the redistributing. Assume one bucket is overflowed and overflowed data items are distributed to the other buckets randomly. Then, given this assumption, N = N − 2 × N /K data items are distributed to the other K = K − 1 buckets randomly. This is a standard balls in bins problem, and the maximum number of balls in any bin is higher than max(2 × N /K , 2 × log K ) with extremely low probability. From below, we can see that the bucket capacity of 2 × N /K is bigger than max(2 × N /K , 2 × log K ).
× log(K − 1) = 2 × log K Therefore, if one bucket being overflowed and overflowed data items being redistributed (the probability that these events occur is extremely low), the probability of another bucket being overflowed is still extremely low. To sum up, if N ≥ K × log K , we can set a bucket capacity of B = O(N /K ) data items to achieve O(N × l) server-side storage and extremely rare overflows.
